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SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF'
In the Michigan sales cases decided during the past year the
chattels involved, ranging from second-hand pickle barrels to a luke
warm, if not hot, car, formed the nuclei of some interesting fact
situations. Only four cases have been discussed in the body of this
article. The remaining few have been relegated to a footnote, either
because of complete lack of novelty or absence of detail in the official
reports.' The four cases discussed are in the areas cf warranties,
chattel mortgages and trust receipts.
WARRANTIES
When the buyer of goods is dissatisfied with his purchase and is
faced with an uncooperative seller, a common course of action is to
claim either the breach of some express warranty or of one of the
implied warranties of quality, either merchantability or fitness. In
Kaufman v. Katz2 the plaintiff, a pickle manufacturer, had purchased
some second-hand barrels from the defendant and used them in his
pickle manufacturing process. A large part of the product had a
peculiar flavor and became soft due to an alleged defect in the barrels.
Plaintiff then brought an action for damages on the theories that there
had been a breach of both an express and an implied warranty that
the barrels were fit for a special purpose. At both the trial and ap-
pellate level there were the usual arguments about the conversations
as to the nature of the barrels and whether the alleged defect caused
the spoilage. This far the case is ordinary and the jury, the trial judge,
and the Michigan Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff's contentions.
The unusual part of the case centers around the fact that the
barrels were second-hand goods although they had purportedly been
reconditioned by the defendant. It was his position that the very fact
that the barrels were second-hand prevented assertion of an implied
warranty of fitness for a special purpose, and he had some Michigan
authority in his favor. Back in 1916, on facts occurring before adop-
tion of the Uniform Sales Act,3 it had been held that there was no
implied warranty of fitness for a special purpose on the sale of a
Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University, member of the Michigan
and New York Bars.
1. Patrick v. Carrier-Stevens Co., 358 Mich. 94, 99 N.W.2d 518 (1959); Ladney
v. Ternes Steel Co., 359 Mich. 228, 102 N.W.2d 178 (1960); Kirkhof Elec. Co. v.
Wolverine Express, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1959), affirmed 269 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1959).
2. 356 Mich. 354, 97 N.W.2d 56 (1959).
3. C.L. §§ 440.1-.78, M.S.A. §§ 19.241-.320.
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used automobile because of the second-hand nature of the chattel.4
Subsequently, two Michigan opinions had paid lip service to this
principle, by way of dictum, but each time stating that the announced
principle was "generally" applicable.5
No definite answer to this problem is supplied by the Uniform
Sales Act as its definition of goods, to which the implied .warranty
obligation attaches, neither includes nor excludes used goods.' The
Michigan Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Kavanagh, aligned
itself with the more modern jurisdictions in repudiating the 1916
decision and permitting plaintiff to recover on an implied warranty
theory.7
Lest there be widespread concern among second-hand merchants
of all varieties, it should be noted that the holding is only that, as a
matter of law, the second-hand nature of the goods will not in all
cases preclude recovery on an implied warranty theory. Plaintiff still
has the burden, which he sustained in this case, of proving that there
is an implied warranty of fitness for a special purpose. Thus it must
be shown that the buyer has made his special need clear to the seller
and has relied on the seller's selection of the product., Further, it is
clear that the implied warranty of merchantability was not in issue
here. Such a warranty imposes the obligation only to deliver goods
of merchantable quality, and the seller's position as a merchant of
used goods would be relevant in determining the standard of mer-
chantability?
A second interesting warranty case was decided by the Sixth
Circuit and reported just before the end of this Survey period. The
plaintiff in Hansen v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co."0 had pur-
chased tubeless tires" directly from the defendant manufacturer. At
the time of the purchase he had viewed certain selling literature
4. Bayer v. Winton Motor Car Co., 194 Mich. 222, 160 N.W. 642 (1916).
5. Hysko v. Morawski, 230 Mich. 221, 202 N.V. 923 (1925); Kirby v. Gibson
Refrigeration Co., 274 Mich. 395, 401, 260 N.W. 840 (1936).
6. C.L. § 440.76(1), M.S.A. § 19.316(1) provides:
"'Goods' include all chattels personal other than things in action and money.
The term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to
or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under
the contract of sale."
7. This holding was only in the alternative since the court found that plaintiff
could also recover for breach of an express warranty.
8. C.L. § 440.15(1), M.S.A. § 19.255(1).
9. C.L. § 440.15(2), M.S.A. § 19.255(2); 1 Williston, Sales § 232 (1948); U.C.C.
§ 2-314(2) and comment 3.
10. 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
11. Other cases involving warranty actions and tubeless tires are: Senter v. B. F.
Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954); Ein v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
173 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ind. 1959); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501
(loth Cir. 1959) (wrongful death action).
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extolling the safety features of the product. Defendant's employees
managed to mount the tires, although some difficulty was experienced,
and plaintiff was later injured in an accident caused by the demount-
ing of these tires while he was traveling around a curve at a high
speed.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged two claims, one in tort for negli-
gence and the other in warranty, the former being abandoned during
the trial. The trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment
n.o.v. on the theory that the only possible basis for liability was im-
proper installation of the tires by defendant's employees. This being
true, plaintiff's abandonment of the negligence claim precluded con-
sideration of any allegedly negligent acts in determining warranty
liability. The Sixth Circuit reversed without considering the inter-
esting question of whether negligent acts may be used as the basis for
claiming breach of warranty.'" It pointed out that the evidence
showed that plaintiff had reasonably relied on the manufacturer's
advertising literature characterizing the tires in question as "safe
enough to control one or two tons .. .at speeds up to 80 miles an
hour . . .safe enough to cling to the road on dangerous curves.""
These statements constituted an express warranty to the purchaser.
In the course of his opinion, Judge Martin noted:
Negligence on the part of the buyer would not operate as a defense
to the breach of warranty. If the manufacturer chooses to extend the
scope of his liability by certifying certain qualities as existent, the neg-
ligent acts of the buyer, bringing about the revelation that the qualities
do not exist, would not defeat recovery.' 4
In so stating he relied upon the Michigan decision in Bahliman v.
Hudson Motor Car Co. 5 wherein the plaintiff sued for breach of
warranty, having learned that his car roof was not as safe as he had
been told. In the Bahlman case, Justice Butzel rejected the contention
that since the plaintiff was driving in a negligent manner, he could
not recover for breach of warranty.' 6
Use of the phrase "contributory negligence" in this context can
blur some distinctions best illustrated by two hypothetical situations
suggested by the Bahlman decision. Suppose that P, having had
several severe accidents, wishes to drive a car that will protect him
from his reckless inclinations. He purchases a car from S after re-
ceiving an express warranty that the roof will hold up if the car rolls
12. Such a situation would be unusual. Warranty is usually the refuge of those
unable to establish facts showing negligence.
13. 276 F.2d at 256.
14. 276 F.2d at 258.
15. 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
16. Id. at 688-693, 288 N.W. at 310-313.
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over. While driving at an excessive rate of speed he is struck by
another automobile driven by T. P is injured when the roof caves in
while the car is rolling over after the crash. T will not be liable to P,
assuming that T was driving negligently, because P is barred by con-
tributory negligence. However, the relation between P and S is not
disturbed by P's reckless acts. If P sues S for breach of express war-
ranty the issue is not one of negligence or contributory negligence
but only whether P reasonably relied on S's affirmation that the course
of conduct actually pursued and the consequences would not injure P.
Varying the facts slightly, assume that P was injured not by a
vulnerable roof but because the door popped open on impact and he
was thrown out. The P-T suit is resolved as before. But when P sues
S the result is different. P cannot recover. This is not because he was
guilty of contributory negligence. His acts were the same in both
examples. It is because his inury cannot be linked to non-perform-
ance of an assurance given by S and characterization of P's conduct
as negligence does not solve problems in this area."
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Migratory automobiles subject to chattel mortgages create seri-
ous and sometimes perplexing problems. Judging by the amount of
reported litigation,18 it is not uncommon for a car to be transported
across state lines and sold quickly without discharge of any encum-
brances. Then the seller skips and the chattel mortgagee in one state
and the purchaser in another are left with a law suit.
In Commerce Acceptance Co. v. Denton,19 S purchased a new
car in Oklahoma which he sold soon thereafter to defendant, a
Michigan automobile dealer. Plaintiff, who was the holder of a chattel
mortgage on the car, recorded in Oklahoma, sought to replevy it. The
Oklahoma certificate of title, which had been exhibited to defendant
by S, contained space for the notation of liens, but with these caution-
ary words: "This is not an office of record for the filing of liens and
does not guarantee the state as to liens in this certificate of title.) 20
The majority rule in the United States, reached in 1941 in Michi-
gan through legislative action,2 ' is that the recording laws of the state
of execution will protect the mortgagee if the chattel is removed from
17. Justice Butzel's reasoning on the issue of contributory negligence is questioned
in Leidy, Another New Tort?, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 964, 981-984 (1940). The defense of
the user's unreasonable conduct is discussed in Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale LJ. 1099, 1147-48 (1960).
18. Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 813 (1951).
19. 357 Mich. 394, 98 N.W.2d 633 (1959).
20. Defendant's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Appendix, p. 13a.
21. C.L. § 566.140a, M.S.A. § 26.929(1).
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the jurisdiction without his consent. Since Oklahoma permits, but
does not require,2 notation of the lien in the certificate, it would seem
to follow that the chattel mortgage would be good as against the
Michigan purchaser.
Defendant, however, advanced a defense of estoppel. His argu-
ment was that since there were steps which plaintiff could conceivably
have taken to secure notation of the lien on the certificate, he was
now estopped from claiming an interest in the automobile. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's judgment for the
plaintiff held, (1) that defendant was not a bona fide purchaser in
good faith and (2) rejected the possibility that there was any basis
for invoking an estoppel.
On the first ground, the court reasoned that since a disclaimer
appeared on the face of the certificate, defendant did not act in good
faith. This is in direct conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court
of Arizona dealing with the same type of Oklahoma certificate. -3
Adoption of this absolute rule in Michigan precludes consideration
of any fault in plaintiff's conduct. The trial court's suggestion that
defendant, an experienced merchant, did not act in good faith because
he knew the name of the new car dealer and could have called him
or checked with the proper recording office is preferable.'
The second ground of decision rests on a firmer foundation. "As
a matter of fact, the grounds for an estoppel do not here exist. '"'
The record does not reveal facts showing that the plaintiff in any
way prevented notation of the lien on the certificate. In such a
situation the result might well be different 2 6
TRUST REC EPTS
The final case worthy of note involved a construction of the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act, adopted in Michigan in 1952.27 The trust
receipt, a security device with which some lawyers are not familiar,28
gives the lender (designated as the entruster) a security interest in
goods held by the borrower (designated as the trustee). The indi-
22. Okla. Laws 1935, § 1, 46 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 57 (1954); Okla. Laws 1955,
§ 1, 47 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 23.3 (1960 Supp.).
23. Dissing v. Jones, 85 Ariz. 139, 333 P.2d 725 (1958).
24. Record, pp. 36-37 as cited in defendant's Appendix, pp. 10a-lla.
25. 357 Mich. at 399, 98 N.W.2d at 635. Only defendant fied a brief and appendix
so that it is not possible to have a complete picture of what happened when S secured
his mortgage.
26. See, e.g., Dissing v. Jones, supra note 21.
27. C.L. §§ 555.401-.419, M.S.A. §§ 19.535(I)-(19).
28. See Dart Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Corp., plaintiff's Appendix, p. 21b, infra
note 30.
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vidual loan transactions are not recorded; only a yearly statement
of intention to engage in this type of financing is necessary. If the
entruster conforms to the many technical requirements of the act,
he will secure protection against the honest insolvency of the trustee
by being able to retake the security. He also secures some protection
against the trustee's dishonest disposition of the goods, but the extent
of this depends upon the nature of the security, when filing occurred
in relation to the time of disposition of the security, and the type of
person to whom the security was transferred, e.g. a bulk buyer or a
chattel mortgagee.
If the trustee sells the goods and is to account for the proceeds
of the sale to the entruster then the entruster acquires a substituted
security interest tin the proceeds. 9 In Dart Nat'l Bank v. Mid-
States Corp.,3" E, the Entruster, provided the credit with which T,
the trustee, was able to acquire some trailers for the purpose of
retail sale. Upon the conditional sale of one trailer to P, T failed to
account to E, but negotiated and assigned the conditional sales note
and contract to B, a bank. The required statement of trust receipt
financing had been filed but B had no actual notice of it. E discovered
the fraud of T and secured possession of the trailer from P. B, claim-
ing title to the trailer because of a default under the conditional sales
contract, 31 brought an action of replevin against E.
Since the conditional sales contract and note were the proceeds
of a sale of entrusted property, the question before the court was
whether the entruster had a superior claim to that of B. Under the
statute,
Nothing . . . shall limit the rights of purchasers in good faith and
for value from the trustee of negotiable instruments or negotiable
documents, and purchasers taking from the trustee for value, in good
faith, and by transfer in the customary manner, instruments in such
form as are by common practice purchased and sold as if negotiable,
shall hold such instruments free of the entruster's interest; and filing
under this act shall not be deemed to constitute notice of the entruster's
interest to purchasers in good faith and for value of such documents
or instruments, other than transferees in bulk.3 2
The court held that the note was negotiable and the contract an
instrument within the quoted statutory language, and further that
the transfer to B was in the customary manner for instruments which
are treated as negotiable. It, therefore, affirmed the lower court's
29. C.L. § 555.410, M.S.A. § 19.535(10).
30. 356 Mich. 574, 97 N.W.2d 98 (1959).
31. The default was not in payment but in permitting the entruster to take
possession. See defendant's Appendix, p. 28a.
32. C.,. § 555.409(1) (a), M.S.A. § 19.535(9)(1) (a).
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judgment for the purchasing bank, a decision which is in conformity
with authority in other jurisdictions.23
33. Citizens Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank v. Beverly Fin. Co., 127 Cal. App.2d 553,
273 P.2d 714 (1954); Canandaigua Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
285 App. Div. 7, 135 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1954) (Sup. Ct. 1953).
The outline of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in the text is necessarily sketchy
because of its complex nature. Those wishing to know more about it may consult the
following: McGowan, Trust Receipts (1947); Bogert, Effect of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 26 (1935); Rlohr, Some Problems in Trust Receipt
Financing, 3 Wayne L. Rev. 22 (1956), Vold, Sales §§ 70-75 (1959). A comprehensive
bibliography can be found in Hanna, Cases and Materials on Security 52-53 (1959).
